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PRESIDENT'S NOTES
During the past year we have heard a
swelling of voices raised in protest
against nuclear -weapons. These voices
have echoed through Europe and have
been joined in strident chorus by a
Because a number of students had
growing number of voices within the
voiced concern over the ongoing debate
United Scates. Many of these voices
and its implications for military officers,
come from people who are genuinely
we recencly spent an afternoon at the
concerned about the prospect of nuclear
Naval War College listening co a panel
war and the concomitant effects of such
of distinguished clergy and laymen
a war upon the world in which we live.
present their views on the question of
One of the major voices has been that of
the morality of nucle.ar deterrence. The
the American clergy.
majority did not share the views of the
A number of clergymen of a particu
spokesman for the extreme view, but
lar faith have spoken out on the im
emphasized the need for curbing the
morality of the use of, or the threat to
arms race through arms control, point
use, nuclear weapons. They hold that: it
ing out that a strategy of nuclear deter
is immoral to use the (strategic) nuclear
rence was morally tolerable; not satisfac
arsenal of the United States; it is im
rory, but tolerable.
Fortunately, there was also a recogni
moral co make declarations of the intent
tion of the need to defend one's country
to use the (strategic) nuclear forces of
and home against aggression in any
the United States; but, mere possession
form. Our scudents, who participated on
of the strategic arsenal as a deterrent is
a voluntary basis, questioned the panel
morally neutral, i.e., there is no objec
at length. At the end of the session,
tion to the possession of nuclear
many questions remained and, while no
weapons while arms control negotia
solutions were reached, it was a good
tions proceed (while foreswearing any
airing of a timely and sensitive question.
use of or threat to use nuclear weapons).
This debate was, in microcosm, a
This latter point has a subtlety which
reflection of the enigma of nuclear
many, including the Soviet Union, will
weapons. The genie is indeed out of the
find difficult to grasp. The corollary ro
bottle and the practicality of stuffing it
this proposition is that military officers
back in the bottle is extremely remote
who participate in planning for the use
under current conditions of the super
of nuclear weapons or who are associ
power relationship.
ated with the employment of nuclear
1 have talked with a number of people
weapons cannot morally belong ro the
faith
of
those
espousing
this
proposi
who
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/32 oppose reliance on nuclear 4
weapons in any form. Unfortunately,
tion.

War College: March & April 1982 Full Issue

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1982

5

Naval War College Review, Vol. 35 [1982], No. 2, Art. 32

3

THE FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE
SUBMARINE-AN IRRESISTIBLE FUTURE
by
Captain Robert H. Smith, U.S. Navy (Retired)
human flavor, the exhilaratio n when
Several decades ago, when the fleet
the firsr topside hatch is flung open at
ballistic missile sub marines were first
patrol's end, the joy of fresh air and
commencing their patrols1 copies of a
sunlight once again.
certain seascape were distribured. Sub
An irresistible idea from the outset,
titled "Polaris on Station," it showed a n
the argument for p lacing more nuclear
empty ocean and a gull wheeling above
deterrent power in submarines grows
rhe gray waves. The painting was a
stronger, Yet doubts persistently
favorite of Admiral Arleigh Burke, then
shadow that message so perfectly con•
CNO, who saw ro it chat it came to the
veyed in Admiral Burke's popular sea
attention of many.
The SSBNs are o n patrol still. Their
scape,
Some shadows should dissipate natu·
missiles, increasing in range, accuracy
rally. The saga of the Trident subma
and payload, have evolved smoothly
rine's construction diffirulries wnl not
through successiv e modifi cations of
be dweUed upon. One suspects1 from
Polaris and Poseidon; there is now
history of other painfully born weapons
Trident [ and eventually there will be
svstems, that the troubles will recede in
Trident !I. Year airer year SSBNs have
their wakes as first Ohio, and rhen other
been going to sea1 disappearing and
T ridents, slip away on patrol routinely
returning in accordance with rheir un�
and all but unnoticed. Nothing van�
announced schedules. The Blue crew
quishes criticism like success.
departs, the Gold takes over. The very
silence that attends iris testimony to the
Ambivalence pervades the Navy's
own attitudes towards irs SSBN s. There
soundness of the concept. the technical
is admiration for their superb profes�
skill and imagination going into its cre
sjonalism, respect for their viral role.
ation, and no less to the character and
But rhere is also the view that regards
training of those w ho man the
the SSBNs as a force apart, not really
"Boomers." Some day, far off, they will
quire naval at ail, while at the same time
tell their stories; perhaps too there will
they are large consumers of resources
be novels worthy of these men and their
that presuma bly could be used to 6
ships. The right ones will catch the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/32

War College: March & April 1982 Full Issue

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1982

7

Naval War College Review, Vol. 35 [1982], No. 2, Art. 32

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/32

8

War College: March & April 1982 Full Issue

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1982

9

Naval War College Review, Vol. 35 [1982], No. 2, Art. 32

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/32

10

War College: March & April 1982 Full Issue

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1982

11

Naval War College Review, Vol. 35 [1982], No. 2, Art. 32

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/32

12

War College: March & April 1982 Full Issue

10

NOW IS THE TIME
TO: RETHINK, REDESIGN, AND REDEPLOY
NAVAL AVIATION
by
Captain William K. Sullivan, U.S. Navy
Therefore, in planning naval avia
Naval commanders have always
tion's future, we should establish certain
prided themselves on the Service's
criteria which, in the face of uncercaimy.
ability to operate outside rhe constraints
will provide a force capable of sup
of politics ashore while still remaining
readily available ne-arby at sea ro inter•
potting out national strategy. These
are:
cede as necessary. Partly foe rhis reason,
• To maintain our flexibility while
naval aviation and the Marines have
confronting strategic and economic
played prominent roles in most crises
uncerraimy,
since the end of World War IL
However, unless our forces become
• To integrate and correlate our
existing forces where possible to srrerch
dramatically stronger than they are
now, we cannot continue to musrer local
their operating capability,
superiority in such areas as the Arabian
• To be prepared to conrinue wirh a
fleet of fewer than 600 ships.
Sea on a sustained basis while still
If rhe budget axe falls rhen we will
mai nrnining carrier presence elsewhere,
still want rn maintain che offensive
Any attempt co do so will aggravate
capabiJiry inherem in our carrier battle
personnel and maintenance problems
long present within the navaI air forces,
groups. The geographic range of rhe
and could deal a final dearh blow ro
Navy's responsibilities is too broad, and
ics forces too smali, co adopt a defensive
near-rerm readiness, Clearly, if we are co
posrnre in a global conflicc The war
go on deploying in the ways to which we
must be taken co the enemy, with rhe
have become accusromed, we must have
objective of destroying his navitl forces
more ships. Still, a goal of 600 ships now
so we can retain our freedom of action.
appears on its way to becoming the
Perhaps1 then j a new way co deploying
victim of any one of several facrors:
our carriers should be considered, one
• Major defense curs required to
which permits us to concenrrate
balance the feden1I budget or to make
superior power at the point of confron
way for revived social progrnms.
tation so that the battle can be fought on
• Failure co meet retenrion and en
our rerms.
listment goals in rhe Iong term.
• Inability of the industrial base in
A N etv Carrier Deployment Policy.
The traditional way ro provide com�
the near term to increase ship construe�
bar capability in supporr of a U.S. 13
tion significantly.
Published
by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1982
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"BUTCHER AND BOl,T":
ADMIRAL ROGER KEYES AND
BRITISH COMBINED OPERATIONS, 1940-1941
by
Glen St.

J. Barclay

primary purpose 1 the closure of rhe
"Amphibious warfare and combined
German tJ�boat base at Bruges. 2 Chur�
operations," claimed Admiral of rhe
Fleet Lord Roger Keyes, shortly after
chill nonerhetess described it as "the
greatesr feat of arms in the Great War
having been dismissed by Prime Min
and certainly .. , unsurpassed in the
ister Winston S. Churchill from his posr
as Direcrorof Combined Operations, "is
hisrory of the Royal Navy."'
a form of warfare which is responsible
Before the second world war assaults
for the foundation of our great world
of this kind, but hopefully more success
wide Empire."' It would indeed have
ful, appealed to the Commander-in
been difficult for an island power to
Chief Plymouth Station, Admiral Sir
have acqufred an empire any other way.
Reginald Ernest-Ernie-Plunkett-Drax,
Combined operacions of one form or
as an appropriate offensive strategy for
another certainly constituted the most
the United Kingdom in a future
characteristic mode of warfare adopted
European war. He proposed ro Admiral
by the British during the period when
of rhe Fleer Lord Cork and Orrery in
Keyes wasDirecror of Combined Opera
September 193 7 that "one or two
brigades of Royal Marines should be
tions. They were also, under his direc
tion, the most conspicuously unreward
entered and specifically trained as an
amphibious striking force. It would be
ing in terms of practical military results.
Keyes' own introduction to combined
of great value if even one division of the
operations was the bloody and unsuccess�
British Army could be given special
ful assault on Gallipoliin 191 S. He later
training in combined operations, "1 In
commanded the ,great seaborne raid on
February 1939 Drax composed a memo
Zeebrugge in 1918. This was also
randum pointing out thac "the U.S.
Royal Marines [sic] are regarded every
categorized by British official historians
Published
by U.S. Naval
WarJtCollege
Digital
Commons,
where as a 'corps d'elite' because they 21
as a failure,
because
did not
achieve
its 1982
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THE OLD DESTROYERMAN'S TRIVIA QUIZ
compiled by
Captain W.G. Carson, USN
(with help from a few other ancient mariners)
6. How many rounds were in a clip
of 40mm ammunition?
7. What was the name of the plot
quiz triggers long dormant memories.
ring device used for dose-in, repetitive
Many of the items we re essential to the
attacks on a submarine by two de�
skills and training necessary to get
through the daily business of the fleet,
stroyers that were using hedgehogs or
depth charges?
but haven't been used now in a decade or
more, Even if you have never served in
8. What was TBS?
destroyers, you'll probably find things
9. What were the rules of rhe road
h ere that will rkkle your memory if you
for an encounter between a ship and a
are older, or amuse you if you are
waterborne seaplane?
younger,
10, What was Sniffer?
Some of the questions have more
11. What was the mental crutch ro
than one answer, and in general the
remember the difference between
more hoary the answer the higher the
Method Rum and Method Coke when
score. See rhe next page for the answers
reorienting a bent-line screen?
and to find out just how ancient a
l2. Of what use was a table of havermariner you really are,
sines?
I. Wharorder was given to the helm
13. What was Weapon Alfa?
just prior m rolling a depth charge
14. What was a cruising rurbine?
pattern?
15. What were the Piano /Jags used
for?
2. What was a DM?
16. Why did "Pouncers Red" cause
3. What was the publication num
hearts to skip a b ear?
ber for rhe signal book before it became
17. What kind of ship was USS Black
ATP-I (Volume II)?
hawk?
4. Why did DERs rend ro cause
l8. What type of craft used the
confusion in exercises in coordinated
"skJmmer-scrapper" tactic?
antisubmarine warfare?
19. What type of overhead was there
wasWar
a speed
ey operator?
Published5.byWhat
U.S. Naval
CollegekDigital
Commons, 1982on the bridge of your first destroyer? 33
If you served in destroyers in the
1940s, 50s or 60s, you'll find that this
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THE POLITICS OF BEGIN'S BAGHDAD RAID
by
Captain M. Thomas Davis, U.S. Army
There have been numerous dramatic
developments in the Middle East during
the past year. Although 1981 will not be
remembered ns a year that contained
events with the significance of those in
1956, 1967, 1973, and 1977, it will
nonetheless be recalled as a turbulent
and intense year in the history of this
most dynamic area. It saw an intt�nsi•
fication of the trauma and agony in
Lebanon; a clash between Israel and
Syria over the legitimacy of the political
"turf" controlled by each around the
Lirani River basin; the reelection of
Menachem Begin and the appointment
of a more nationalist1 ideologically
doctrinaire Israeli cabinet; an escalating
confrontation between the United
States and Libya in ways that sometimes
went beyond the verbal; the brutal
murder of Anwar Sadat; and the effec

Otganization made by two ex-Presi�
dents and a former national security
advisor.
But of all the Middle Eastern drama
which 1981 provided, perhaps the most
significant in terms of its long-range
impact was the 7 June destruetion of the
Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak by the
Israeli Air Force. Coming at a time
when the new Reagan administration

was just beginning the formulation of a
comprehensive Middle Eastern policy,
and following the laborious efforts of
the President's special envoy, Philip
Habib, to control and defuse the seem
ingly explosive confrontation between
Israel and Syria in southern Lebanon,
this provocative. unilateral action by the
Begin government created perceptions
in the United States and elsewhere from
which BeBin's I.ikud party leadership
will have difficulty recovering.
tive annexation of the Syrian Golan
In additio n to antagonizing the
Heights by the Israeli Government, The
Reagan administration, the raid has
year revealed the scope of the increas
illustrated quite dearly that the interests
ingly strained relations between the
of the United States and Israel in the
United States and Israel as the divergent
Middle East are in many ways very
interests of the two countries became
more apparent to Washington if not to
distinct, and it has initiated a reappraisal
of American4 Israeli relations that has
Jerusalem. The year just prior also saw
found favorable response in the Ameri
demands in the United States for a
can press and whh the Amerkan
fundamental reconsideration of the
public. 1 All of these developments are
Amcrkan-lsraeH association, a phenom
extremely serious for Israel's long�term
enon best illusrrated by calls for negotia
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/32
interests particularly if the cooling 36
dons with the Palestine Liberation
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At the root of every legal question
is not an answer but a doubt,"
11

RULES OF THUMB FOR GUT DECISIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EMERGENCIES
by
Alfred P. Rubin
In my personal library there is a
provisions dealing with contraband and
prize court proceedings. Such a compila�
rather tattered and stained, leather
bound book published in 174 I by the
tion was not only useful but a practical
British Admiralty and issued co Navy
necessity in 1741 if Great Britain were
commanders. It is titled, Extract! from
to give her navy the job of protecting
Bricish commerce at sea.
the Se-veral Treatjes Subsisting Between
It would he both undesirable and
Great Britain and Other Kingdoms and
impossible to compose an equivalent
State; of such Articles and Clauses as
compilation for our naval commanders
Relate to the Duty and Conduct of the
Commanders of the King of Great
today, It is impossible to furnish our
naval commanders with a compilation
Britain'J Ships of War, Ir is 264 pages
long and contains in elegant print the
of all the rreaty articles that might
pertinent articles of all the treaties with
pe rtain to their duties because of the
growth of the international community
France 1 Spain, the Ne therlands,
and the proliferation of treaties and
Belgium (then called rhe Austrian
execurive agreements pe rtinent ro
Neth erlands), Portugal, Russia,
seaborne commerce and the laws of war,
Sweden, Denmark, Savoy (now ex
and other matters of possible immediate
panded to a united Italy), Turkey,
concern to naval commanders, like Indi
Morocco, Algiers, Tripoli (now called
viduals' rights to political asylum. To
Libya), and Tunis. The oldesr is with the
serve a function equivalent to the 1741
Austrian Netherlands, and dates to
compilation a current volume would
1495, The compilation is current as of
have to be huge, cross-indexed, and
1741. Some of the articles deal with the
accompanied by inrerpretive legal memo
rights of merchants as neutrals when
randa and philosophical analyses of the
the other treaty party is exercising
impact of treaty commitments on third
belligerent rights, such as blockade,
against a third srate; some with the
parties, the implications of inconsistent
obllgations owed to the same party,
incidents of peaceful seaborne trade,
different parties, international organ1za 44
some with belligerent rights as between
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/32
tions, and parties with reservations or
the treaty partners themselves t such as
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THE GREAT SEA RACE
by
Passed Assistant Engineer Frank M. Bennett, U.S. Navy•
$25,000 for each quarrer-knot the speed
The large swift cruiser was given the
name Columbia, and her remarkable
might fall below twenty-one knots. The
speed and beautiful appearance have
official steam trial took place November
combined ro make her the pride of the
18th, 1893, and the Columbia main
tained for four consecurive hours the
new navy and have won for her the
popular appellation, "The Gem of the
remarkable speed of 22.8 knots; the
Ocean.'' The name bestowed upon her is
premium for seven quarter-knots in
in accordance with a law req uiring
excess of the contract speed amounted
vessels of her size to be named after
to $350,000.
states of the Union, rhe District of
For the legislarion that called this
Columbia being regarded as a state for
magnificent specimen of rhe engineer's
this purpose.While work was progress
art imo existence the naval service is
ing on rhe designs for rhis so-called
indebted to Honorable Charles A.
commerce-destroyer, Chief Engineer
Boutelle more than to any one man1
N.P. Towne, lJ .S. Navy, then director of
while credit for her wonderful steaming
the drafting room of the Bureau of
qualities belongs to Engineer-in-Chief
Steam Engineering, facetiously dubbed
George W. Melville. Mr. Boutelle was
her the Pfrate l and this name, being
Chairman of rhe Committee on Navat
seized upon by the newspapers as
Affairs in the House of Representatives
appropriate. dung to her long after the
and he had much opposition to over
come, both in his commJtree room and
amhorized name was announced, and
has appeared many times in serious use
on the floor of the House before the
building of the ship was voted. This
both at home and abroad in descriptions
opposition was based upon doubt as to
of the ship. The Columbia was built by
the possibility of building a ship of the
the Cramp Company from design s
size and speed proposed, and also as to
furnished by the Bureaus of Steam
the propriety of providing vessels of
Engineering and Construction and
such a type for the Navy. Mr. Boutelle
Repair, the contract price being
knew, just as Mr. Isherwood had known
S2, 725,000. A speed of twenty-one knots
maintained for four consecutive hours
was specified and a premium of $50,000
offered for each quarter-knot in excess
•Adapted from Bennett's The Stet1m Nt11-·y of
lh6 Vn;t6d S1ateI (Pittsburg: 1896}, pp. 821 ·833, 54
of this, while a penalty was provided of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/32
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,,Absolute War u,i/1 not occ11r,"

THE ESSENTIAL CLAUSEWITZ
by
B.M. Simpson III
that Clausewitz never intended, notably
Clausewitz' major work, On War, is
that he placed his emphasis on specific
long, lnvolved, murky, and overpower�
wars. On the contrary, he used spedfic
lng. Nevertheless, it is the most
wars to illustrate his thesis that con
thorough and comprehensive book on
cerned war as a whole. In short Clause�
the phenomenon of war in world litera
win' work is nor an adjunct to
ture. While there are many fine analytiw
Napoleonic warfare,
cal histories that describe wars, their
Clausewitz attaches great importance
causes and their effects, no one has
to theory. The function of theory is a
published another book that explains in
systematic elucidation or analysis. In
a philosophical and analytical manner
deed, this is the meaning of the Greek
rhe phenomenon of war as a whole,
root theon"a, The purpose of theory is to
On War is an unfinished work, pub�
order knowledge and to provide a refer
lished by Frau Clausewitz afrer her
ence poinr, or philosophical sea buoy,
husband's death. Only Chapter l of
from which additional investigation can
Book I satisfied the author. It was
take its departure.
written in a style common co rhe early
He writes out no prescriptions: He
19th century, using the Hegelian
does not attempt to tell us what plans
method of fitst stating and developing a
will work and what will not. Rather, in
thesis and then an aotirhesis. FinaJly,
descriptive fashion he presents his
the writer produces a synthesis. Unless
theory as an analytical investigation
the reader is aware of what Clausewit;z is
thar leads to knowledge and co a
doing, it may seem that he is contra�
thorough familiarity with the subject.
dieting himself.
military history, 1
Clausewitz' theory of war was con
firmed by the Nap oleonic wars, not
Clausewitz establishes criteria that
his descriptive rheory must fulflll: 1
deduced from rhem. To read Clausewitz
as an explanation of rhe European wars
L Investigation o( the subjects that
Published
U.S. Naval War
College
Commons, 1982
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Summers points out while the United States, violating the precepts of
CJausewicz. gor into trouble, the North Vietnamese, who adhered ro
Clausewitz, won,
No one can expect to under stand strategy merely by reading and quoting
from Clausewitz, Mahan, and suchlike. What ic rakes is deep rhought plus the
ability to appreciate the influences of the physical aspects of warfare
geography, time, distance, and capabilities-to atrain an intuitive under
standing of the whole problem.
The essence of strategy lies in an authoritative combination of: the
objective, i.e., the effect desired; the means, i.e., power derived from
resources; and the scheme or plan to use the means to achieve the effecr
desired.
But, if a man cannot make an intuitive evaluation of rhc relationship of key
objectives, ractkal and logistical resources, and time, he is still not asrratcgist.
What he is is a mere speculator.
While Clausewitz should be studied, no one should think that he is the final
aurhodty. What he did was to provide us with a splendid base from which to
develop our own id eas.
Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U.S. Navy (Retired)

"Why Most Hov� Foiled" (eonl'd)
Sir:
FJ. West 1 Jr,, writing in the March�Apdl 1981 issue of rhe Naval W.;r
Colle[!,e Re-i1iew, ''Secretaries of Defense; Why Most Have Failed" has
ignored a critical aspect of the Defense "problem.'' Thut aspect (which
determines co a large degree rhe focus of the Serretary's efforts) is the
environment in which he operates.
Washington, D.C. today is more known for the military "expertise" thar
lies outside of the Pentagon than rhat which resides within it! The
exponential growth in Congressional staffs coupJed with an increased
wilHngness ro exercise Congress' oversight prerogative has pJaced OSD
management into a fishbowl, In addition, the fiscal pressures and control�
ability of DOD expe nditures has led to increased attention and "micro
management" on the part of 0MB, Faced with rhese adversaries (who
because of political or budgetary rime perspectives focused on short�term
"fixes") the Secretary of Defense had little choice but to meet the attack h}'
focusing on the management of the Department.
This focus on management was of course percch,ed by the services as
micro-managemem on the part of OSD. Yer on many occasions when the
political appointees confined themselves to making "polky" the services
appeared to act to thwarc those policies, This resulted in some few cases
because of a fundamentaJ disagreement with the policy but more often was
simply a classic example of bureaucratic inertia, In any evenr the end result
was often an intensified focus on management tO insure that policies were
followed.
Add to this mixture a manager's narurnl urge to focus on something
tangible and the outcome was assured. Thus it is not too surprising that
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/32
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PROFESSIONAL READING
"Proof, in its way, that we have been living
it1 an intellectually dark age.''
by
Robert 8. Bathurst•
Baylis,John and Segal, Gerald, eds. Soviet Str,tegy. Totowa, NJ-: Allanhel<l
Osmun, 2982. 263pp.$31.85
There has come tO be something of an Aberystwyth School of Soviet
Srraregk studies. The University College of Wales is the home of some very
active thinkerS in the field. Two,John Baylis and Gerald Segal, are both the
editors and authors of a long introduction ro the present volume. In addition,
two of rhe contribucors, Ken Doorh and Michael MccGwire, are presenr or
former scholars there. The orher wrirers included are well known in rhe field.
They have been intellectual pace-setters for years. There are no surprises
here.
Ir would be useful to be able to say in what way the Aberystwyth School Ls
distinguished from others or in whar direction iris tending, Presumably this
volume should give a clue, but if it does. it is well hidden. The editors say thar
rhe reason for the book is that It sought "to combine the mosr important
argumenrs from both sides [here they mean the right and the left, che hawks
and the dovesl presenting a broad analysis ol the key features of Soviet
strategy," They have tried to accomplish this rnsk by selecting seven essays,
almost establishment essays, for republicarion. The essars are divided imo
headings (which seem to me to overreach their content) and the whole 250
pages, together with the inrroduction, constitutes wha[ is being called "Soviet
Strategy."
One muse ask who comprises the intended audience for chis book. The
answer is not obvious to thjs reader, As the authors are already widely read
and their positions are well known, the value of collecting a few arcicles from
the seventies is not Jmmediately apparent. There is not enough work in chis
book to treat any one aspect of Soviet strategy or any one author adeq uately.
Two of the articles were published first in 1973. The mosrr ecemly published,
Michael MccGwire's, is dated 1980 but it recapitulates (albeit in a very useful
form) che results of his thought of three decades.
Perhaps the value rheedirors had in mind was co bring these useful articles
together, unless, as I have besun co fear, they had some notion that their
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1982
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Polmar, Norman & Allen, Thomas B.
Rickover-Controversy and Genius
A Biography. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1982. 725pp. $20.75
"Some day I hope the Navy wlll have
officers who will understand odd offi
cers with odd talents." So said Ruth
Masters Rickover in 1958 on one of the
rare occasions she allowed herself to be
interviewed by the press. Polmar and
Allen in their rather lengthy and
detailed biography describe Admiral
Rickover's oddities of character and
actions as well as his peculiar ralenrs to
get rhings done, As noted in the subtitle,
it deals with a very controversial man
with an undeniable genius,
Admiral Rickover) born in Poland,
served o.lmost 60 years on active duty
afrer his commissioning in 1922. Until
1937, he served as a line ofiicer in four
piper destroyers, bartleships, and subma�
rines. He was XO of the S-48 for two
years and had a brief stim of 2½ months
in command of a minesweep jn the
Asiatic Fleer. After his initial tour as an
EDO at theCavite Navy Yard, Rickover
served almost his entire ED career at
rhe seat of government, Washington,
D,C, 1 in the Navy Department and,
since 1949, concurrently in the AEC
(Deparrment of Energy). He served
actively fifteen years as a line officer and
almost 4 5 years as an EDO.
For p rofessional Navy people age 45
and beyond-active and retired-there
is little in this book about Rickover that
has not been recorded before. This is nor

extensive interviews or correspondence
with more than 200 persons in the
Navy, the Navy Reactor Branch, DOE,
and the civilian power and shipbuilding
industries on the subjeet of Admiral
Rkkover and nuclear power. The
chapter notes, bibliography, acknowl
edgements, and index should be most
useful to orhers interested Jn the
Rickover phenomenon.
t: oder Rickover-the zeafous, tyran•
nical, autocratic driver of borh Navy and
industry and godchild of solons on the
Hill-NauJilus, the world's first nuclear
powered ship} was completed and oper
ating in 1954. By 1960, fifteen nuclear
submadncs were in commission; by
1967, the Polaris program's 41 SSBNs
were completed; and by 1981, a total of
128 nuclear powered combat ships was
operating, Over a quarter of the ships of
the Navy are nuclear powered, Rick
over's influence on today's Navy has
been monumental-both materially and
psychologically.
Admiral Rickover's material accom
plishmems have been widely acclaimed
over the past quarter century-he is
named In the dictionaries as being
responsible for the development of the
atomic submarine. Even so. there are
those who have vociferously challenged
his methods, if not his technkal leader
ship-e.g., Rear Adms. J. James, A.
Mumma� R. Moore; former chiefs/
deputy chiefs, Bureau of Ships. Re·
fer ring ro Rickover, Capt. Dick Lanning
(first CO of Seawol/SSN) has suggested
that "When a revolurionary succeeds, he
surprising, given Rickover's recognition
should be given five years then shot, or
as a most skillful public relations practi�
otherwise removed." Rickover's per
tioner and his outstanding political
sonal control of all government or
acumen. Admiral Rickover has written
industry-sponsored R&D in nuclear
6 books, made more rhan 65 major
power was virtually unlimited-any
speeches on various subjects since 195 5,
such research that had been initiated but
and has more than 1 million words of
not sponsored by Rickover was stopped,
offkial testimony recorded in the
abruptly.
Congress of the United States. The
The psychological impact of Rickover
authors, however, have made a solid
on the Navy is probably more profound
conrribution ro Rickover lore, They
but not so readily apparent. The authors
have done a rhorough job of research in
suggest that we have two Navies-one, 72
the printed medium 1 in oral history, in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/32
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United States. This was actually a
Haggie, Paul. Britannia at Bay: The
constant theme in British grand strategy
Defence of the British Umpire
A1s,1inst Japan, 1931-194 I. New
throughout the 19,0s. However, the
Yotk: Clarendon Press, Oxford Univer
Americans refused to commit them�
selves to any form of meaningful
sity Press, 1981. 264pp. $49.50
alliance. Although Haggie does not
By the mid-1930s, Britain was faced
explicitly criticize American poli cy , his
with the prospeet of conflict in three
separate theaters against three <lifferent
description of that policy ]eaves little
opponents: Japan in the Far East; Italy
doubt that he believes it was foolhardy.
The <lCnouement of this sad taJe came in
in the Mediterranean and Germany on
the European continent, Britain unfortu
the immediate aftermath of Pearl
nately did not have the ne cessary
Harbor, when the Japanese sank the
resources foe dealing with all three
Prince of Waler and the Repulre, and
contingencies simultaneously, Conse
then caprured Singapore. This was "die
quently* in allocating her scarce re
greatest single disaster to Bt itish arms
sources 1 she was involved in a constant
since Yorktown."
juggling an. This excellent book, which
Although Haggie is well aware of the
is based on a careful examination of the
formidable, if not impossible, task that
official records of the period as well as
British poli cy makers faced ln the iate
numerous collections of private papers,
t930s and eatly 1940s as they sought to
graphically details the policies purSued
devise a deterrent strategy for the Far
in the Far East as the aging British
East, he is also sharply critical of British
Empire tded to check a rising Japan,
thinking in these years. For exampJe he
It was the Japanese who first imer�
argues that although the British recog
rupted the relative calm of the interwar
nized that Japan was a threat, they
petiod with their invasion of Manchuria
consistently underestimated Japanese
(1931). At the time, the British were
military prowess, Equally importanc,
committed to sending immediately the
the British failed ro recognize that naval
Main Fleet 10 Singapore. And through•
forces alone would not be able to deal
out the l930s, as the German and Italian
with theJapanese threat, They were tied
ro "an obsolete maritime strategy." The
threats emerged, Britain still main�
tained its commitment ro sending a fleet
rise of air power after Wocld War I,
to comest the Japanese. However, as
coupled with the mobility of land armies
Haggie shows, this was a hollow
in the industrial age. meant that Britain
would have ro send large�scale ground
promise by the end of the 1930s.
forces and air forces as well as naval
Certainly, the decision in rhe firsr part
forces to deal with the Japanese. Of
of l938 nor ro build a two-ocean navy
course, since Britain did not even have
removed any chance of sending a fleer to
rhe resources ro send a formidable naval
the Far Easr. Finally, in 1939, with a
force to the Pacific, one cannot help but,
European war on the horizon, British
wonder whether ir would have made
planners decided to concentrate on
much difference if Britain had recog�
launching an offensive in the Mediter
nized the need to send greater numbers
ranean. There would be no fleet for the
of air force and army units. By 1939.
Far East.
Britain's strategic needs were so much
Those first years of rhe European war
greater than her available resources that
(1939-1941) were filled with disasrers
it was inevitable that she would suffer
for the British. Nor surprisingly, the
some egregious losses in the war. Imagi�
Japanese rook full advanrage of Britain's
native strategic thinking might have
weakness. The British searched in vain
helped somewhat, but in the end, as
for a way to check the Japanese. Mainly,
Haggie makes dear, Britain just did nor 76
rhey sought to ally themselves with the
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adequate support and direction from
U.S. Army Air Forces to be caught on
Washington. There is a fascinating
the ground and destroyed. Thanks to
this avoidable blunder the Japanese
account of his relations with General
MacArthur, rhen his military junior.
gained air superiority over the Philip�
The relations were not good. Mac
pines in one stroke. Then it was only a
matter of time befote they triumphed.
Arthur's petulance, his arrogance, and
his blindness to military and naval
The absence of air defense anywhere,
realities are revealed for all to see. How
even over their base, meant that the
Hart dealt with MacArthur is a lesson In
surface ships could not attack the
Japanese successfully, The only remain•
wisdom and forbearance.
When Hart returned home he did not
ing naval weapon was the submarine.
Soon Han and his 29 submarine com•
retire. He served on the General Board
and he conducted an extensive inquiry
manders (rhe number of submarines
had risen during his tenure) learned to
into the disaster at Pead Harbor,
Finally, when he retired from active
their dismay, that they were armed with
duty he served for rwo years as United
torpedoes so defective as to be useless.
Thus the Asiatic Fleet was robbed of all
Stares Senator from C..onnecticut. He
was blessed with a happy old age and
its weapons,
There was little that Han could do.
died in 1971 at the age of 94.
His common sense and his professional
The task of a biographer is not only co
judgment dictated a withdrawal of his
tell the story of his subject's life against
forces from the Philippines, rather than
the background of his time, but also to
wasting them in action doomed to
expiain and to describe rhe man, In this
failure against the Japanese. Reluc
respect Lemze has done an admirable
job, Hart kept a personal diary in which
tantly, he ordered his forces to retire to
he recorded the events of his life and his
the south. He and his small staff left in a
submarine and under the keels of the
innermost thoughts, Leurze's keen
conquering Japanese fleer proceeded to
insighrs tell us the kind of man Harr was
Java. MacArrhur complained to Wash•
and his historian's discipJine prevents
ingron that the navy had deserted him.
him from descending the slippery slope
When he arrived in Java Harr found
of psycho-history. The result is a vivid
to his surprise thar he had been ap�
and compelling picture of a man and his
times. It is also a model of what
pointed the naval commander of a new
allied command for Southeast Asia. His
biography can and should be.
tenure in rhat position was brief�
B. MITCHELL SIMPSON 111
marked as it was by continuing reverses
Newport, Rhode Island
at the hands of superiorJapanese forces,
Ball, Desmond. Polit/er and Force
by Dutch imrigue to have their own
Level,: The Strategic Miu/le Pro
admiral appointed to his position, and
gram of the Kennedy Administration.
by MacArthur's malicious complaints to
Berkeley: University of California
Washington. Finally, after much compli
Press, 1980. 322pp. $27.50
cated maneuvering inJava,London, and
Desmond Ball has produced a careWashington, Hart was asked to request
fully documented and well-written study
his relief.
Leutze properly devores the major
of the srrategic missile program of rhe
portion of his fascinaring and well·
Kennedy administration. He demon
strates that this buildup was not, as is
written biography to this short but
commonly assumed. a response to the
extremely important period in Hart's
life. He sets the stage for these compli•
"missile gap" because Kennedy and his
cared events and he tells of the great
advisors no longer believed in the
difficulties
H art
had inDigital
receiving
existence of such a gap at the time they 79
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